federalist paper argument electoral college

the People of the State of New York: THE more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections, contained in the plan of the convention, when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this qualification, however, that. "But it was not sufficient say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, "for the convention to adhere to the republican form. The separate States or confederacies would be necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the temptations to that kind of trade by the lowness of their duties. Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as imaginary. In such a posture of things, the public decision might be less swayed by prepossessions in favor of the legislative party. Had every State a right to regulate the value of its coin, there might be as many different currencies as States, and thus the intercourse among them would be impeded; retrospective alterations in its value might be made, and thus the citizens of other States. In the first view, appeals to the people at fixed periods appear to be nearly as ineligible as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge. New York, situated as she is, would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank to the weight of that confederacy.

I am not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish the American from other popular governments, as well ancient as modern; and which render extreme circumspection necessary, in reasoning from the one case to the other. Jay, for the Independent Journal - - 3, the Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence. It has been erroneously insinuated. And it cannot admit of a serious doubt, that this state of things must rest on the basis of a general Union. On the first supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents. And politicians have ever with great reason considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of political connection. The power of raising armies at all, under those constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to reside anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it was superfluous, if not absurd, to declare that a matter should not be done without the consent. Finding themselves, though thus supported, unequal to the undertaking, they once more had recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the succor of foreign arms.